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Abstract 
[Excerpt] A majority of the 154,532 steelworkers who are presently laid off will never go back to work. 
They will be shut out of the steel industry because the steel companies have a new game plan. They plan 
to increase profits in such a way that they will not need to employ many steelworkers. In an effort to raise 
the price of steel and reduce labor costs, the steel companies will continue to cut down steel capacity, 
shut down old mills and departments and introduce labor-displacing technology. Unless public pressure 
forces the government to step in and change this game plan, the steel industry, steelworkers, and steel 
communities will never be the same—even with an upturn in the economy. 
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Steel: Past the Crossroads 
by Tom DuBois 
USWA Local 1014, Gary, Indiana 
Introduction 
A majority of the 154,532 steelworkers 
who are presently laid off will never go 
back to work. They will be shut out of 
the steel industry because the steel 
companies have a new game plan. They 
plan to increase profits in such a way 
that they will not need to employ many 
steelworkers. In an effort to raise the 
price of steel and reduce labor costs, the 
steel companies will continue to cut 
down steel capacity, shut down old 
mills and departments and introduce 
labor-displacing technology. Unless 
public pressure forces the government 
to step in and change this game plan, 
the steel industry, steelworkers, and 
steel communities will never be the 
same—even with an upturn in the 
economy. 
Steel Management 
Steelworkers' jobs are in jeopardy 
now because the poor managment 
strategies of the steel corporations 
allowed many manufacturing facilities 
to become outdated and inferior to 
those of foreign corporations. The com-
panies' current emphasis on making 
profits rather than making steel, makes 
the problem even worse. 
The steel industry's problems have 
their origin in 1901, when multi-
millionaire banker J.P. Morgan created 
the U.S. Steel Corporation. Ever since, 
the companies have followed a financial 
strategy that has retarded the 
development of the U.S. steel industry. 
As early as 1936, Fortune magazine 
recognized the problems caused by steel 
management: 
"(U.S. Steel), founded by finan-
ciers, has been dominated ever 
since by financially-minded men. 
The great question is how much 
has it been interested in protecting 
its investment (which means 
stabilizing) and how much in 
making and selling steel (which 
meant pioneering). 
The chief energies of the men 
who guided the Corporation were 
directed to preventing deteriora-
tion in the investment value of the 
enormous properties confided to 
their care The super conser-
vative outlook of the Corporation 
has been contagious and the steel 
masters have in matters of policy 
acted like bankers. They have 
preferred to take no risks The 
industry still suffers from three 
decades of inertia.1" 
The conservatism of steelmakers 
continued from the 1930's to the 
present. In the 1960's, Henry Broude, 
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Research and Development Expenditures— 1977-1981 
(dollars In millions, % oi sales) 
Company '81 '80 % '79 '78 HI % 
Integrated 
Armco 
Bethlehem 
Interlake 
Republic 
U.S. Steel 
Alloy/Specialty 
Carpenter Tech 
Bundy 
Western 
$35.8 
.4 
3.3 
74.4 
$13.5 
1.5 
.8 
.5 
.7 
.3 
.5 
2.4 
.9 
1.6 
$29.9 
45.1 
18.7 
56.1 
$13.4 
1.8 
.6 
.5 
.7 
.5 
.5 
2.4 
1.2 
1.1 
$41.1 
18.9 
56.6 
$12.2 
1.9 
.6 
.5 
.4 
2.6 
1.1 
$37.1 
15.1 
52.5 
$ 9.4 
1.7 
.6 
.4 
.5 
2.4 
1.3 
$42.7 
16.8 
49.8 
$ 9.2 
1.6 
.8 
.6 
.5 
2.8 
1.4 
"There has been a steady decline in domestic R & D in steel. The current emphasis is on using existing 
technologies to solve immediate problems in order to secure a fast payof f . . . . " (p. 77) 
"These figures for the steel industry are very low. The only domestic manufacturing industry with a lower 
level of R & D spending is the textile industry; the aluminum industry spends about twice as much." (p. 96) 
—Office of Technology Assessment report 
after doing extensive interviews with 
steel executives, wrote: 
7
'These men feel a managerial 
obligation to stockholders 
They fulfill a leadership function, 
but one colored by a good measure 
of risk aversion.2" 
Just four years ago, Dr. Bela Gold, 
Professor of Industrial Economics at 
Case Western University, found that 
the steel companies have continued to 
neglect long-term production needs. He 
said that: 
' 'Maximizing short-term 
profitability tends to encourage 
concentration on relatively low-
cost and quickly-effected innova-
tions. Our highly developed 
capital markets facilitate the rapid 
reallocation of investments from 
one company to another on the 
basis of changing information 
provided by quarterly financial 
statements The use of capital 
budgeting techniques whose 
substantial discounting of future 
returns also tends to favor shorter-
term investments.3" 
Dr. Gold's analysis was reinforced by 
a recent study by Harvard Business 
School professors which attempted to 
explain the loss of competitiveness in 
the American steel industry. They 
argued that American management's 
"super safe, no risk" mentality and 
their devotion to "modern" manage-
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ment techniques result in inadequate 
long-term investment.4 Not only have 
real (adjusted for inflation) capital 
expenditures declined but what was 
spent was spent poorly. "Bad" choices 
made as a short-term perspective led to 
a "static" view of technology and of 
market demands, not a "dynamic" 
view of future possibilities. 
Technological Lag 
The effect of management's short-
term approach to investment decisions 
is that the U.S. steel industry lags 
behind its foreign competition in the 
adoption of many different forms of 
steel-making technology. This can be 
demonstrated most clearly by looking at 
the various processes that make up steel 
production. 
A. Coke-making 
In formcoke technology, for example, 
a government study notes that "the 
U.S. led in the early development but 
Capital Expenditures Per Ton of Steel Shipped — 1979-1981 
Armco 
Bethlehem 
Inland 
LTV 
National 
Republic 
U.S. Steel* 
Industry Average 
*U.S. Steel ranks the lowest in 
(figures in 
1981 and next to lowest 
parantheses represent 1979 dollars per ton) 
in the other two 
37.66 
34.01 
20.05 
31.56 
28.15 
45.26 
24.61 
31.61 
years. 
(30.05) 
(27.14) 
(16.00) 
(25.19) 
(22.47) 
(36.13) 
(19.64) 
(25.23) 
19.52 
40.51 
41.81 
27.65 
40.26 
55.07 
26.09 
35.84 
(17.19) 
(35.68) 
(36.83) 
(24.35) 
(35.46) 
(48.51) 
(22.98) 
(31.57) 
11.23 
26.02 
43.29 
32.74 
24.27 
46.28 
24.93 
29«.82 
"The real issue here is whether the workers.should have to pay for steel management's 20 years of failure to 
modernize. The steel industry's inability to compete. . . is largely due to its own shortsightedness." 
—William Winpisinger, President, IAM 
Annual Average of Capital 
Expenditures on Steelmaking Facilities 
(per ton of finished steel shipped in 1978 dollars) 
$36.30 
$31.57 
1950-58 1959-68 1969-1978 
most of the ongoing development is 
occuring abroad Eight of the ten 
leading formcoking processes and a 
score of less advanced concepts have 
been developed outside the U.S."5 
The same pattern can be seen in dry 
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quenching of coke. An article in the 
American Metal Markets stated that: 
"Japanese steelmakers have 
recently installed a number of dry 
quenching units at their steel 
plants, and one, Nippon Kokan 
KK is trying to sell its know-how 
and designs for dry quenching in 
the U.S Dry quenching of 
coke is an old energy-saving 
technology which has yet to find a 
home in the domestic steel 
indus t ry (It) was first 
developed by a Swiss firm, Sulzer 
Brothers, soon after World 
WarH."6 
B. Iron Making 
Japanese leadership is equally clear in 
iron-making. Steel Industry Economics 
points out, "the Japanese have been the 
leaders in the development of the 
'giant' blast furnaces. As the U.S. 
industry began to build them, they 
sought Japanese assistance. In 1976, the 
U.S. had 6 of them compared with 37 in 
Japan and 17 in Europe."7 
C. Steel Making 
American industry has also been very 
slow to adopt basic oxygen process 
technology (BOF). In 1966, a study by 
Professor Adams and Dirlan found that: 
The Diffusion of Oxygen Steeimaking 
12 Countries, 1961-1978 
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"In innovation, as in invention, 
the giants of the U.S. steel 
industry lagged not led. The first 
large scale commercial use of the 
oxygen plan was in an Austrian 
steel plant in 1952. The first 
installation of the new process on 
the North American continent 
took place in a Canadian plant in 
1954.... The leaders of the U.S. 
steel industry finally decided to 
innovate this revolutionary pro-
cess fully 14 years after an 
Austrian company of infinitesimal 
size had done so, successfully."8 
After BOFs were finally introduced in 
the U.S., American industry continued 
to lag in their use. Since 1969, BOF 
capacity has continued to grow in 
Europe and Japan but has lagged in the 
U.S. By 1981, 61 percent of U.S. 
capacity was BOF compared to 75 
percent in Japan, 80 percent in 
Germany and 84 percent in France. 
D. Continuous Casting 
Continuous casting was not intro-
duced on a large scale until oxygen 
converters came into widespread use in 
steelmaking. David Ault, in an article in 
Western Economic Journal said that: 
"By the end of 1964, virtually all of 
the Western European producers 
had purchased patent rights on 
on 
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machines from Concast AG. of 
Zurich, the owner of the patents 
on the perfected technique. 
Japanese producers acquired a 
continuous casting machine in 
1960 and began commercial 
production shortly thereafter. 
Major U.S. producers did not 
attempt commercial production 
until 1967, and continuously cast 
steel products accounted for only 
less than 1 percent of total output 
by the end of the decade com-
pared with 11.3 percent in 
Canada, 8.2 percent in West 
Germany, and so on."9 
E. Other Technologies 
The list of " l agg ing U.S . 
technologies" is long. Development of 
ladle metallurgy and continuous 
annealing would certainly be on it.10 
In order to get a sense of the overall 
picture, we can look at the data on 
technology transfer. An article in 
American Metal Markets stated that, "Of 
18 agreements between domestic and 
Japanese steel companies only two of 
them are for providing U.S. technology 
to Japanese producers."11 
The Effect of Technological Lag 
On Vulnerable Steelworkers 
The fact that many U.S. facilities are 
"out of date" means that the industry is 
not cost-competitive vis-a-vis foreign 
facilities. U.S. steel now costs on 
average approximately $100 per ton 
more than Japanese steel. A large per-
centage of the cost difference can be 
attributed to higher American energy 
costs. Hans Mueller and K. Kawahito 
note that "the Japanese steel industry is 
the leader in energy efficiency, using 
only 20.4 million BTU per ton of steel 
products versus 30.4 million BTU for the 
U.S." As energy costs have jumped in 
the 1970's, this Japanese advantage has 
become very important.12 
Older facilities also use raw materials 
less efficiently. The U.S. has the 
distinction of being, according to the 
U.S . Office of Technological 
Assessment, "the only major producing 
country where raw materials costs 
became a larger proportion of total 
production costs. In other countries raw 
materials became a smaller element of 
production costs "13 
The U.S. technology lag also has an 
impact on labor productivity, for older 
facilities use labor less efficiently. After 
studying comparative productivity in 
the U.S. and other steel industries, the 
Technology Gap: 
Steelmaking Processes 1981 
Open Hearth 
Basic Oxygen 
Electric Furnace 
U.S. 
Open Hearth 
Basic Oxygen 
Electric Furnace 
Japan 
Open Hearth 
Basic Oxygen 
Electric Furnace 
Germany 
Open Hearth 
Basic Oxygen 
Electric Furnace 
France 
80% 
84% 
12 Midwest Center for Labor Research 
U.S. Department of Labor concluded 
that American s tee lworkers ' 
productivity was amazingly high 
considering the outmoded equipment 
they had to work with.14 
Finally, the technology lag had its 
impact on the U.S. steel industry's 
economic health. Adams and Dirlan 
concluded in their study that the wrong 
decision made by U.S. corporations to 
build more open hearth capacity rather 
than basic oxygen furnaces in the 1950's 
was an important reason why the 
companies' profits suffered later on.15 
David Ault found that the advantages 
enjoyed by foreign producers, who 
introduced continuous casters before 
U.S. firms did, allowed U.S. com-
petitors "to expand their market shares 
at the margin and to erode U.S. market 
shares even further."16 
Making Less Steel 
In the preceding section, we saw how 
poor U.S. Steel investment strategy 
created a technologically backward, 
high-cost industry. We now turn to the 
steel companies' strategy for solving 
their problems. A major part of their 
present plan is to produce less steel and 
sell it at higher prices. This strategy is a 
loser for steel workers. 
After a rapid rise in total steel-making 
capacity during the 1960s, steel com-
panies are now experiencing an equally 
rapid decline in capacity as plants and 
sections of plants are wiped out. The 
waves of shutdowns from 1977 to 1979 
reduced capacity of raw steel produc-
tion from 160 million tons to 153 million 
tons. The "official" level is now about 
150 million. Forecasters predict further 
permanent reductions of 15 to 26 million 
tons. This is between 10 and 20 percent 
of total output.17 
We are all familiar with one form that 
reduction will take—the closings of 
entire plants. Bethlehem's Lackawanna 
plant and most of Armco's plate steel 
plant in Houston are the two most 
recent examples. According to the Wall 
Street Journal, two Republic Steel plants 
in Buffalo and Cleveland and some U.S. 
steel facilities in the Pittsburgh area are 
"among the candidates" for closings.18 
Most capacity reduction will come from 
closing sections of existing plants; 
however, companies will also begin to 
consolidate production in more modern 
or better located facilities. For example, 
both Republic and Jones & Laughlin 
have closed several coke plants and 
consolidated production in one 
location. (See the Appendix for more 
details.) U.S. Steel's President Roderick 
predicted recently that "some flat-rolled 
mills are going to close in the next 12 to 
24 months."19 
It is possible that shutdowns like 
these are just the tip of the iceberg. Back 
in 1980, Dr. Donald Bamett, steel 
economist, predicted that if the steel 
industry did not significantly increase 
its capital expenditures, most of its 
facilities that were more than 25 years 
old would have to be closed.20 What's 
happened since? In 1982, the industry's 
capital expenditures were only $2.1 
billion. Predictions for 1983 are that 
capital expenditures will be only $2 
billion.21 That's not even enough to 
keep the average age of existing 
facilities from getting older; and it won't 
come close to modernizing equipment 
that desperately needs it. 
If current trends continue, we could 
see the "liquidation scenario" of the 
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American Iron and Steel Institute and 
the Office of Technology Assessment 
(OTA) feecomfe a WeMy. 
<5m this country aHSrei thfe large 
Wdticffoh *of &iM:WaW^ ¥^®£&y feat 
itfrfe Amferic&n Iron and Steel ffisttfete, 
whose mefitffeirs include aH. «e§f %he U.S. 
steelmakers, recently puMfeh%9%|>aper 
argiiihg that "the media view th^t the 
doir^Ttfc mdusfiy'S problems are 
^sseniHaHy #fe caiisequence of 'excess 
capacity' fe cfegffly wrong The 
United Sfafes is tire only major 
mdusferfal h¥fioh Lm "the "worM whose 
%teel Stdtrsfity eanhdt -faHSJl ife own 
dorirest&c cc&stiir5>ficffi Y^^iremknts 
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€cdhofific *acffvfty./ ^ 
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:fo be ^ i fe fe fd wife Iprc^icfioh 
^ac f ty ) '& ^proxffi^fely 4ffl) ffiMlion 
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fOT t^eei? 
TMfe wbiiia ^be % %hM^ » !*Sfe in 
imports and a sharp rise in steel prices. 
This is the "scenario" that steel 
executives and stock analysts are trying 
to create—"spectacular profits."24 
Thus, the Wall Street Journal reported 
th&t "Retirement of aging arid 
technologically obsolete capacity has 
emerged as a prime element of domestic 
steelmakers' strategy to firm up prices 
when a recovery does come."25 
As the AISI warned recently, 
"Without sufficient domestic capacity 
in the United States, there could be 
increased foreign d e p e n d e n c e , 
decreased national security, vulner-
ability to supply shortages, and higher 
prices."26 In dther words, capacity 
declines would be disastrous for the 
nation; disa^ti*ous for the industry; and 
^disastrous for 4he steelworkers, their 
families , and communities. 
New Technology-
Is There Hdpe for Steelworkers? 
Steelworkers are not only threatened 
with the industry's plans to cut back 
capacity. They are also threatened by 
the industry's plans to modernize 
facilities. Where this modernization 
occurs, steelworkers will lose jobs more 
often than gain them. 
The " w i n n e r s " and " l o s e r s " 
14 Midwest Center for Labor Research 
resulting from technological change can 
be predicted now. A knowledge of 
where the jobs will be lost and gained 
should help individuals and com-
munities plan for their own futures. 
The following chart presents 
projected job losses and gains in dif-
ferent segments of the steel industry 
Employment in Steel 
Technology and Jobs: Projected Losses 
and Gains in Jobs (1978-1988) 
Area 
Coke Batteries 
Blast Furnaces 
Electric Furnace 
Open Hearth 
Basic Oxygen 
Strand Casters 
Ingot Casters 
Primary Mills 
Finishing Mills 
Job 
Loss/Gain 
-6 ,646 
-6 ,294 
+ 7,400 
-11,631 
+ 2,266 
+ 11,883 
-5 ,539 
-9 ,617 
+ 4,200 
Source: Steel at the Crossroads, AISI. 
Change in 
Labor/Hours 
Per Year 
-13 .2 
-12 .5 
+ 14.7 
-23 .1 
+ 4.5 
+ 23.6 
-11 .0 
-19 .1 
+ 8.4 
Facts on Declining Employment 
Highest Employment for Production and 
Maintenance—1953: over 571,000 
Employment—March 1982: 234,000 
Years 
1950-1960 
1960-1970 
1970-1980 
Decline 
78,200 
41,900 
112,500 
Annual Rate 
- 1 . 6 % 
- 0 . 9 % 
- 3 . 1 % 
Total/30 years— 232,600 Lost Jobs 
1981— 78,400 Lost Jobs 
during the coming years. It was derived 
from a chart provideed AISI in 1980 and 
should be used with one caution: 
because the industry has decreased 
capacity since the projections were 
made, the job loss estimates indicated 
on the chart are too low and should be 
revised upward. In those areas where 
the chart shows a modest gain, a small 
loss should be substituted. (See 
Appendix article "Technology and Job 
Loss/') 
The Loss of Jobs 
How many jobs will be permanently 
lost if the industry carries out its 
strategy of reducing capacity and 
modernizing selected facilities? 
A rough estimate may be made by 
looking at past employment cycles. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, steel pro-
duction more than recovered from each 
"downturn," but employment never 
did. Then, during the 1978-79 recovery, 
annual average employment remained 
virtually flat. Apparently, when steel 
production begins to pick up, steel com-
panies combine jobs, work the existing 
work-force overtime, and install new 
technology rather than recalling former 
employees or hiring new ones. 
Let's look at the employment figures 
for November, 1982. In that month, 
there were 152,000 steelworkers 
employed. This reflects a drop of about 
150,000 workers from the peak in 1981. 
We can estimate that only 60,000 of 
those who were laid off will return, 
while 90,000 steelworkers will never 
return. 
Is this estimate an exaggeration? How 
do we make it? 
The AISI estimates that, if the steel 
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r . . i - n I 
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rM 
Steel Production (million tons) 
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h- 720 
L-775 
L-770 
L-705 
L-700 
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industry reduced its capacity by 20 per-
cent in the years 1981 through 1988, the 
industry would employ 90,000 fewer 
people in 1988 than it had in 1981. But 
steel capacity is expected to drop to 20 
percent below its 1981 peak in 1983 
rather than in 1988. Therefore, we 
estimate that those 90,000 steelworkers 
won't be needed to run the mills at their 
reduced capacity.27 
The permanent job loss of some 
90,000 wage and salary steel workers is 
of such a magnitude that no existing re-
training program will help. William 
Roesch, president of U.S. Steel, 
compared the situation to: 
"his own early career in the coal 
industry just after WWII and the 
shrinkage of employment there 
from 400,000 new workers at that 
time to about 200,000 now. Some 
workers found new employment 
in the then growing auto industry, 
he said. But others, usually over 
50 years of age, are 'not interested 
16 Midwest Center for Labor Research 
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in re-training or relocation. As a 
result, pockets of poverty still exist 
throughout Appalachia,' he said. 
'When the jobs disappeared those 
who didn't find other work 
collected unemployment until it 
ran out and then went on welfare. 
National policy toward the prob-
lem of displaced workers is little 
different today. The problem will 
only exacerbate for steel and other 
manufacturing industries,' he 
said."28 
Jan/81 
Needed: An Alternative Approach 
To the Steel Industry's Future 
Today there is no growing auto 
industry into which unemployed 
steel workers can be absorbed. Some 
retraining can be done for jobs in the 
service sector, but that is not a solution 
for the massive displacement we face. 
And what about the young people who 
in years past would have gone to work 
in "the mill." They are already being 
trained for those service sector jobs. 
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There aren't enough jobs there to go 
around.29 
The situation of middle aged and 
older steel workers is desperate. Many 
can be seen wandering the streets of 
cities like Gary, Indiana, with their old 
steel mill caps and jackets, looking lost 
and forgotten. 
This nation needs a new national 
policy to save steelworker jobs, steel 
communities, and the steel industry. A 
full analysis of what needs to be done is 
beyond the scope of this paper. But we 
can say that efforts to prevent plant 
closings through collective bargaining 
and through legislation are necessary. 
Existing jobs must be maintained and 
not combined. Job security provisions 
must be provided for in the contract. 
Worker ownership efforts must be 
analyzed and supported where they are 
sound. 
In addition, the provisions of the 
"Technology Bill of Rights" (See 
Appendix II) must be considered and 
implemented. And, as Jack Metzgar 
suggests in another article in this 
publication, we need a National 
Industrial Policy that will provide a 
framework for efforts to save the steel 
industry. 
In order to provide steel to consumers 
in a low-cost, efficient manner and to 
provide employment for thousands of 
Americans, we need one thing 
more—alternative forms of ownership 
and management. What these forms 
will be is too early to predict. But, 
throughout the rest of the world, there 
are all kinds of examples of alternative 
forms of ownership. These examples 
provide us with an enormous wealth of 
experience. It's time to study that 
experience and to discuss alternatives. 
"This nation needs 
a new national policy 
to save 
steelworker jobs, 
steel communities, 
and the steel 
industry." 
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